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In designing dynamic shared service systems that incentivize customers to opt for shared rather than exclu-
sive service, the traditional notion of individual rationality may be insufficient, as a customer’s estimated
utility could fluctuate arbitrarily during their time in the shared system, as long as their realized utility at
service completion is not worse than that for exclusive service. In this work, within a model that explic-
itly considers the “inconvenience costs” incurred by customers due to sharing, we introduce the notion of
sequential individual rationality (SIR) that requires that the disutility of existing customers is nonincreasing
as the system state changes due to new customer arrivals. Next, under SIR, we observe that cost sharing
can also be viewed as benefit sharing, which inspires a natural definition of sequential fairness (SF)—the
total incremental benefit due to a new customer is shared among existing customers in proportion to the
incremental inconvenience suffered.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of these notions by applying them to a ridesharing system, where
unexpected detours to pick up subsequent passengers inconvenience the existing passengers. Imposing SIR
and SF reveals interesting and surprising results, including: (a) natural limits on the incremental detours
permissible, (b) exact characterization of “SIR-feasible” routes, which boast sublinear upper and lower
bounds on the fractional detours, (c) exact characterization of sequentially fair cost sharing schemes, which
includes a strong requirement that passengers must compensate each other for the detour inconveniences
that they cause, and (d) new algorithmic problems related to and motivated by SIR.
Key words : shared service system; ridesharing; cost sharing; sequential individual rationality; sequential
fairness; algorithmic mechanism design; graph algorithms
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1. Introduction
Sharing of resources and services is ubiquitous in today’s economy, driven by increasing costs
to the individual of enjoying exclusive access. For example, increased congestion on roads has
pushed more commuters towards public transportation and ridesharing (McKenzie 2015, Sivak
and Schoettle 2016). Funding shortages of governments and thin profit margins of businesses force
more people to share a smaller set of customer-serving resources both physically (contact cen-
ters (Aksin et al. 2007), airport security checks (Cole 2015, Zou et al. 2015)) and virtually (online
services (Armbrust et al. 2010)). The popularity of cloud computing services (e.g., Amazon Web
Services, Microsoft Azure) has increased because they drastically bring down the computing infras-
tructure costs (Kondo et al. 2009, Ahn et al. 2012). Even more examples include spectrum sharing
in wireless networks (Peha 2009), and shared logistics in supply chain distribution networks (Bow-
ersox et al. 2000).
Of particular interest are shared service systems where arriving customers spend a finite amount
of time and money in the system getting served, and leave the system upon service completion.
However, because the service is shared, the time taken for a customer to be served, as well as
the monetary cost of service, can change depending upon the arrival/departure of other customers
into/from the system. Usually, the more the customers that share the same amount of resources, the
more time and less money each individual customer spends in the system. In ridesharing, picking up
an additional passenger involves a detour which increases passengers’ commute times, but brings
down their shares of the total cost. In a priority queue, there are multiple service levels; those
with higher priority (and hence, shorter average waiting times) cost more (Katta and Sethuraman
2005). Due to resource pooling in cloud computing services, the response times for the same load
can be higher if other tenants sharing the same set of resources place concurrent loads, and so,
offerings with such performance variability are priced lower (Jackson 2011).
When designing the pricing or cost sharing scheme for a shared service system, two major
factors that influence a customer’s choice of shared service must be considered: (a) Individual
Rationality (IR), where a customer compares her own utility between the shared and exclusive
service options, and asks herself if the cheaper monetary cost of the shared service is worth the
longer waiting/response time, and (b) Fairness, where a customer compares her utility with those
of other customers in the system, and evaluates whether everyone is “equitably” better off in
opting for the shared service. While traditional notions of IR and fairness capture the requirement
that customers who opt for a shared service are “happier” than they would be had they availed
an exclusive service, they fail to address a customer’s experience during the time they are in the
system due to subsequent arrivals (which could be unexpected), e.g., a sudden burst of arrivals
into a higher-priority queue could frustrate a customer waiting in a lower-priority queue at that
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moment, even if she is later offered a discount for having waited longer. In ridesharing, a frequent
source of frustration are the (often unexpected) detours taken to pick up and/or drop off additional
passengers, which inconvenience existing passengers.
Our goal in this paper is to address this concern by defining appropriate new notions of IR and
fairness, and demonstrate their effectiveness by investigating their consequences (characteristic and
algorithmic) within the context of a specific application, namely ridesharing.
1.1. Our Contributions
First, in Section 2, we introduce the concepts of sequential IR (SIR) and sequential fairness (SF),
that extend their traditional counterparts to be applicable at a finer granularity to a dynamic
shared service system. This involves invoking appropriate IR and fairness constraints every time the
state of the system changes due to a new customer arrival.1 We model the disutility of a customer
as the sum of the monetary cost of service and an “inconvenience cost” due to the presence of other
customers in the system. While IR simply requires the disutility when opting for the shared service
to be not greater than that for an exclusive service, SIR additionally requires the disutility to be
nonincreasing throughout the time spent in the shared system. The companion fairness concept,
SF, requires that the marginal decrease in disutility (the benefit of sharing) every time the state of
the system changes is “equitably” experienced by all the customers in the system. We also briefly
discuss a concern that these strong concepts could be too restrictive to allow feasible practical
policies in certain scenarios.
Next, we apply these concepts to a ridesharing system (motivated by its impact on promoting
sustainable behavior), where cost sharing among passengers is a major design component.2 SIR
targets the oft-lamented pain points due to detours experienced by passengers during the ride, by
ensuring that existing passengers are progressively better off every time an additional passenger is
picked up. In addition, SIR also ensures a certain degree of robustness, e.g., in a dynamic/online
setting, passengers would remain satisfied even if a future pickup is canceled. We show that imposing
SIR and SF on the routing and cost sharing schemes of a ridesharing system is not restrictive; to
the contrary, it brings out several interesting and surprising consequences:
(a) In Section 3.1, we provide an exact characterization (Theorem 1) for any route to be “SIR-
feasible”, that is, there exists some budget-balanced cost sharing scheme that is SIR on that
route. These SIR-feasibility constraints, though fairly straightforward to derive, are necessarily
1 The concepts can be naturally extended to other situations which affect the customer experience, e.g.,
adding/removing service capacity, customer departures, etc.
2 Other elements are effective ride matching, routing, and, in the case of commercial ridesharing, profitability; we
explain how our focus on the costs influences these other factors, e.g., by adding the SIR and SF constraints to a
matching/routing algorithm that is already in use.
Gopalakrishnan, Mukherjee, and Tulabandhula: The Costs and Benefits of Sharing
4 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-17-01173
complex, so in Section 4, we consider a simplified scenario where all the passengers are travelling
to a common destination. For this “single dropoff” scenario, we show that the SIR-feasibility
constraints simplify to natural upper bounds on the incremental detours, that keep shrinking
as the ride progresses towards the destination and as more passengers are picked up.
(b) In a series of theorems (Theorems 2-5) in Section 4.1, we show that the above bounds on
incremental detours can be aggregated to establish upper and lower bounds on the total detour
endured by a passenger as a fraction of their shortest distance to their destination. These
bounds depend on how sensitive the passengers are to detours; in realistic scenarios, these
bounds are sublinear in the number of passengers.
(c) In Section 5, we present an exact characterization of sequentially fair cost sharing schemes for
the single dropoff scenario (Theorem 6), which exposes several practical structural properties
of such schemes, including a surprisingly strong requirement that passengers must compensate
each other for the detour inconveniences that they cause.
(d) Finally, in Section 6, we explore some important algorithmic questions motivated by SIR. In
particular, it is unknown, even for the single dropoff scenario, whether there exists a polynomial
time algorithm to check for the existence of SIR-feasible routes, when restricted to an arbitrary
metric space (we show that it is NP-hard otherwise). Even if so, we show that optimizing for
total distance traveled over SIR-feasible routes is NP-hard (through a reduction from a variant
of Metric-TSP). We then consider a variant of the vehicle routing problem where passengers
are allocated to vehicles such that the total vehicle-miles traveled is minimized. While this
problem is known to be NP-hard in general, we show that it can be solved in polynomial time
given a fixed ordering on the pickup points.
1.2. Related Work
The cost sharing problem for ridesharing has garnered relatively little attention in literature (com-
pared to the ride matching and route optimization problems)—in most existing schemes, individual
passengers are asked to post what they are willing to pay in advance (Cao et al. 2015), share
the total cost proportionately according to the distances travelled (Geisberger et al. 2010, Agatz
et al. 2011), or negotiate their cost shares on their own during/after the ride. Such methods ignore
the real-time costs and delays incurred during the ride (as in the first instance), are insensitive
to the disproportionate delays encountered during the ride (as in the second instance), or lead to
a complicated and often uncomfortable negotiation process between possible strangers (as in the
third instance).
Recent work has studied cost sharing when passengers have significant autonomy in choosing
rides or forming ridesharing groups, e.g., cost sharing schemes based on the concept of kernel in
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cooperative game theory (Bistaffa et al. 2015), second-price auction based solutions (Kleiner et al.
2011), and market based ride-matching models with deficit control (Zhao et al. 2014). Fair cost
sharing in ridesharing has also been studied under a mechanism design framework by Kamar and
Horvitz (2009), where an individually rational VCG-based payment scheme is modified to recover
budget-balance at the cost of incentive compatibility, and by Nguyen (2013), where customers are
offered an additive, detour-based discount, and the allocations and pricing are determined through
an auction. Our work differs from all the above in that we do not make any assumptions about
the mechanics of ride matching; our cost sharing model is independent of the routing framework
(static or dynamic), and is applicable to community carpooling and commercial ridesharing alike.
Moreover, we define a monotonic form of individual rationality for dynamic ridesharing.
Our work is different from the problem of pricing in ridesharing (see, e.g., Banerjee et al. (2015),
Bimpikis et al. (2016)); our focus is on sharing the resulting cost among the passengers.
Previous works on ridesharing that address individual rationality and detour limits treat them
as independent constraints, e.g., Kamar and Horvitz (2009), Santos and Xavier (2013), Pelzer
et al. (2015). In contrast, in our model, requiring (sequential) individual rationality induces natural
bounds on detours experienced by the ridesharing passengers.
There is a plethora of work when it comes to optimization problems in ridesharing (Agatz et al.
2012, Furuhata et al. 2013, Pelzer et al. 2015, Ozkan and Ward 2016, Alonso-Mora et al. 2017).
While the detour constraints that SIR induces can augment any routing optimization problem,
in this paper, we focus on finding an allocation of passengers to vehicles that minimizes the total
vehicle-miles, which is a variant of the vehicle routing problem (Cordeau et al. 2006), with the
additional constraint of SIR.
Variations of individual rationality involving temporal aspects are well studied in the economics
literature, e.g., ex-ante, interim, and ex-post individual rationality in mechanism design (Narahari
et al. 2009), and sequential individual rationality in bargaining and repeated games (Esteban 1991).
However, we are the first to explore its applicability to dynamic shared service systems and fairness
properties of the resulting outcomes.
An extensive literature on cooperative game theory and fair division (Moulin 2004, Jain and
Mahdian 2007) offers various cost sharing schemes that can be analyzed in our framework. Our
view of fairness relies on how the total incremental benefit due to ridesharing is allocated among the
passengers during each stage of the ride (sequential fairness). While we believe the two approaches
are not independent, exploring the connections is beyond the scope of this work.
We now outline some of the related work in cost sharing in a dynamic shared resource alloca-
tion setting, in which our contributions can potentially discover alternate solutions with different
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desiderata. For instance, Elmachtoub and Levi (2014) study online allocation problems where cus-
tomers arrive sequentially, and decisions regarding whether to accept or reject customers must be
made upon their arrival, with the goal of minimizing the sum of production costs (for accepted
customers) and rejection costs.
Additionally, the trade-off of (general forms of) fairness with efficiency for allocation problems
(in different domains, ranging from online advertisement portals (Bateni et al. 2016) to manufac-
turing and retail (Haitao Cui et al. 2007)) has been widely studied in the literature, and recently
conceptualized and studied as the “price of fairness” (Bertsimas et al. 2011, Dickerson et al. 2014,
Heydrich and van Stee 2015). We hope that the concepts of individual rationality and fairness that
our work introduces would inspire similar studies (theoretical and empirical) on their trade-offs
with different notions of efficiency such as social welfare maximization and profit optimization.
2. Sequential Individual Rationality and Sequential Fairness
In this section, we formally define the notions of sequential individual rationality and sequential
fairness for shared service systems. We introduce the necessary notation first.
Let N = {1,2, . . . , n} denote the set of customers, ordered according to their arrival times. Let
ti > 0 denote the time at which customer i∈N arrives into the system, and let T = {t0, t1, t2, . . .},
where t0 = 0. Let `(i) denote the last customer to arrive into the system before i leaves the system.
Let su denote the system state at time u, which encodes the necessary information about all the
customers that are in the system at time u. Let Sij = {su | u ∈ T and ti ≤ u ≤ tj} denote the
information set of states from time ti to tj.
For any j ∈N , let S(j) = {1,2, . . . , j} denote the set of customers who have arrived until tj, and
let OC(S1j) denote the operating cost of the system, conditional on there being no more arrivals
after tj. f denotes the cost sharing scheme according to which the operating cost is shared among
the customers. In particular, the monetary cost of service to customer i∈ S(j), conditional on there
being no more arrivals after tj, is f(i,Sij).
Definition 1. A cost sharing scheme f is budget balanced if∑
i∈S(j)
f(i,Sij) =OC(S1j) ∀ j ∈N . (1)
For any j ∈N , the inconvenience cost incurred by customer i∈ S(j) due to all the other customers
she encounters in the system, assuming no customers arrive after time tj, is denoted by ICi(Sij).
Several factors may affect the monetary and inconvenience costs, whose exact functional forms
would depend on the mechanics of the system being modeled.3
3 For example, one way to model the inconvenience cost could be to measure the additional time the customer spends
in the system compared to when she is the sole customer served, scaled by how much she values a unit of her time.
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2.1. Disutility and Individual Rationality (IR)
The disutility of a customer i, assuming no customers arrive after time tj, is defined as the the
sum of their monetary and inconvenience costs, that is,
DU i(tj) =

DU0i , 0≤ j < i
f(i,Sij) + ICi(Sij), i≤ j ≤ `(i)
DU i(t`(i)), j > `(i)
(2)
where DU0i denotes the disutility corresponding to the exclusive service to customer i.
Definition 2. A cost sharing scheme f is Individually Rational (IR) if
DU i(tn)≤DU i(t0) ∀ i∈N . (3)
2.2. Sequential Individual Rationality (SIR)
While IR ensures that a customer’s disutility at the time of service completion in a shared system is
not greater than that of an exclusive service, it still allows for the disutility to fluctuate arbitrarily
during the time spent in the system, which can negatively affect the customer experience.
Definition 3. A cost sharing scheme f is Sequentially Individually Rational (SIR) if
DU i(tj)≤DU i(tj−1) ∀ 1≤ j ≤ n ∀ i∈N . (4)
2.3. The Benefit of Sharing and Sequential Fairness
Under a cost sharing scheme that is IR, the decrease in disutility to a customer due to her par-
ticipation in a shared service system (the difference between the right and left hand sides of her
IR constraint (3)) can be viewed as her benefit of sharing. Further, it can be seen that the total
benefit of sharing, obtained by summing the individual benefits, is independent of the cost sharing
scheme, as long as it is budget-balanced. This observation exposes an underlying “duality” – a cost
sharing scheme can, in fact, be viewed as a benefit sharing scheme. Such a view invites defining
cost sharing schemes based on traditional notions of fairness, e.g., a fair cost sharing scheme should
distribute the total benefit among the service-sharing customers suitably proportionately.
We extend this notion to budget balanced cost sharing schemes that are SIR by looking into
how they distribute the total incremental benefit due to each subsequent customer arriving into
the system, leading to a natural definition of sequential fairness.
Definition 4. The incremental benefit to customer i ∈ N due to the arrival of an incoming
customer j ∈N is given by
IBi(Sij) =DU i(tj−1)−DU i(tj). (5)
Definition 5. The total incremental benefit due to the arrival of an incoming customer j ∈N
is given by
T IB(Sij) =
∑
i∈S(j)
IBi(Sij). (6)
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We take a very general, but minimal, approach to defining sequential fairness. All that is required
of a cost sharing scheme to be sequentially fair is that, when an incoming customer j arrives into
the system, the portion of the total incremental benefit that is enjoyed by a previous customer
i (1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1), is proportional to the incremental inconvenience cost to i due to the incoming
customer. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 6. Given a vector ~β = (β2, β3, . . . , βn), where 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, a budget
balanced, SIR cost sharing scheme f is ~β-sequentially fair if, for all 2≤ j ≤ n,
IBi(Sij)
T IB(Sij) =
βj
ICi(Sij)−ICi(Si(j−1))∑j−1
m=1(ICm(Smj)−ICm(Sm(j−1)))
, 1≤ i≤ j− 1
1−βj, i= j.
(7)
Here, 1−βj is the fraction of the total incremental benefit enjoyed by the incoming customer j
as a result of joining the service system, and βj, the remaining fraction, is split among the previous
customers. Setting 1− βj = ICj(Sjj)∑j
m=1(ICm(Smj)−ICm(Sm(j−1)))
corresponds to a special case where the
incoming customer is treated just the same as everyone else.
2.4. Weaker Notions of SIR
There may be situations where SIR is so strong that no feasible practical policy can be expected
to satisfy it. For example, in shared service systems where the cost of service is fixed, e.g., priority
queues at airports, banks, and hospitals, SIR-compliant policies would require dynamically adding
service capacity to counter the inconvenience to low-priority customers every time a high-priority
customer arrives into the system. However, it may not be practical to do so each and every time such
an arrival occurs. Therefore, weaker notions of SIR could be proposed, e.g., approximate SIR, where
only a bounded increase in disutility is allowed (which would induce threshold staffing policies). In
addition, when arrivals and service times are modeled probabilistically, as in a queueing system,
appropriate probabilistic notions of SIR may be needed, since requiring SIR on every sample path
could be too restrictive. Future work should explore such interesting extensions.
3. A Model for Cost Sharing in Ridesharing
In this section, we instantiate the above general model for a ridesharing system, where N denotes
the set of passengers. For each passenger i ∈ N , let Si and Di denote their pickup and dropoff
points, which are assumed to belong to an underlying metric space.
Additional Notation: We assume access to a routing algorithm that, given any subset S ⊆N ,
computes a valid route rS (an ordered sequence of pickup/dropoff points) that serves all the
passengers in S. Thus, we define the following distance functions for any subset S ⊆N : (a) d(S; rS)
denotes the total distance traveled along route rS, and (b) di(S; rS), for i ∈ S, denotes the total
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distance traveled along route rS from Si to Di. For simplicity, we assume that the costs are
completely determined by the traversed distances.4
Accordingly, the operational cost (or the “meter fare”), and the inconvenience cost are
OC(S; rS) = αopd(S; rS), and (8)
ICi(S; rS) = αi
(
di(S; rS)− di({i}; r{i})
)
, (9)
where αop > 0 is the price (in commercial ridesharing) or operating cost (in community carpooling)
per unit distance, and, for each i∈N , αi ≥ 0 is her inconvenience cost per unit distance, known as
her “detour sensitivity”. For simplicity, we denote di({i}; r{i}) by SiDi.
The cost sharing scheme f is such that, for any subset S ⊆N , f(i,S; rS) denotes the portion of
OC(S; rS) allocated to passenger i∈ S. We set f(i,S; rS) = 0 whenever i /∈ S.
Disutility, IR and SIR: The definitions of disutility, IR, and SIR from equations (2)-(4) carry
over in a straightforward manner to the ridesharing scenario, with the dependence on the route
emphasized. Thus, DU i(tj) is the disutility of passenger i along a route rN (tj) which is identical
to rN up to time tj, but thereafter does not pick up any more passengers, proceeding only to drop
off the remaining passengers at their respective destinations. Also, the disutility corresponding to
exclusive service is DU0i = f(i,{i}; r{i}) = αopSiDi.
Definition 7. A route rN is IR-feasible (respectively, SIR-feasible) if there exists a budget-
balanced cost sharing scheme f that is IR (respectively, SIR) on rN .
From here on, whenever it is understood from context, we drop the explicit dependence on the
route to simplify notation. Next, we present an illustrative example.
Example 1. Consider n = 3 passengers, picked up from their sources S1, S2, S3 (in that
order),and travelling to a common destination D. The progression of the route rN (t), as the
passengers are picked up one by one, is depicted in Fig. 1. Given the final route rN , the total
distances traveled by passengers 1,2 and 3 are d1(N ) = S1S2 + S2S3 + S3D,d2(N ) = S2S3 + S3D
and d3(N ) = S3D. The total distance traveled is d(N ) = S1S2 +S2S3 +S3D. The operational cost
is thus OC(N ) = αop(S1S2 +S2S3 +S3D). Therefore, if f is a budget balanced cost sharing scheme,
f(1,N ) + f(2,N ) + f(3,N ) = αop(S1S2 +S2S3 +S3D).
The inconvenience costs incurred by each passenger due to other passengers are:
IC1(N ) = α1(S1S2 +S2S3 +S3D−S1D),
IC2(N ) = α2(S2S3 +S3D−S2D),
IC3(N ) = α3(S3D−S3D) = 0.
4 It is straightforward to extend our model and results to costs that depend on a combination of distance and time.
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Figure 1 Route progress while picking up passengers traveling to a common destination.
Thus, a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme f is IR on route rN if
f(1,N ) +α1(S1S2 +S2S3 +S3D−S1D)≤ αopS1D,
f(2,N ) +α2(S2S3 +S3D−S2D)≤ αopS2D,
f(3,N )≤ αopS3D.
The SIR constraints are stronger, since they require IR at every stage of the ride:
f(1,N ) +α1(S1S2 +S2S3 +S3D−S1D)≤ f(1,N \{3}) +α1(S1S2 +S2D−S1D)≤ αopS1D,
f(2,N ) +α2(S2S3 +S3D−S2D)≤ f(2,N \{3})≤ αopS2D,
f(3,N )≤ αopS3D.
A necessary condition for the route to be SIR-feasible is therefore obtained by summing up these
inequalities (at each stage), using budget-balance of f , and simplifying:
S2S3 +S3D−S2D≤ αop
αop +α1 +α2
S3D and S1S2 +S2D−S1D≤ αop
αop +α1
S2D.
These “triangle inequalities” can be interpreted as imposing upper bounds on the incremental
detours at every stage of the ride. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4.
3.1. Characterizing SIR-Feasibile Routes
The intuition gained from Example 1 suggests that routes with “large” detours are unlikely to
be SIR-feasible, that is, no budget-balanced cost sharing scheme would be SIR on such routes.
Theorem 1 provides a formal characterization of SIR-feasible routes.5
Theorem 1. A route rN is SIR-feasible if and only if
αop
(
d(S(j))− d(S(j− 1))
)
+
j−1∑
i=1
αi
(
di(S(j))− di(S(j− 1))
)
≤ αopd({j})−αj
(
dj(S(j))− d({j})
)
, ∀ 2≤ j ≤ n.
(10)
5 Such a characterization would be useful to augment a routing algorithm in suggesting SIR-feasible routes (when
grouping ridesharing requests and assigning them to vehicles).
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The proof is from expanding SIR constraints and algebraic manipulation (Appendix A.1).
Note that the SIR-feasibility equation (10) only guarantees that there exists a budget balanced
cost sharing scheme that is SIR on route rN . To check whether a specific cost sharing scheme is
SIR, we would have to go back to the individual constraints (4).
The recursive nature of the SIR-feasibility equation (10) makes it particularly easy to be incor-
porated into practical routing algorithms that involve sequential decision making, especially in
dynamic ridesharing (see Section 6).
4. The Single Dropoff Scenario
The previous section illustrates the complexity of the most general case, where the route rN consists
of multiple pickup and dropoff points. Unfortunately, this complexity makes it difficult to infer a
useful interpretation of the SIR-feasibility constraints (10). Thus, in this section, we consider the
special case where all passengers 1≤ j ≤ n are traveling to a common destination Dj =D, which
exposes an interesting property of SIR, namely, that SIR translates to “natural” bounds on the
incremental detours. We begin this section by simplifying the general expressions introduced in
Section 3 to the single dropoff scenario.
We denote the distance between any two locations A and B in the underlying metric space by
AB. Recall that S(j) = {1,2, . . . , j}, and that we hide the explicit dependence on the routes to
simplify notation. Thus, the distance functions become
d(S(j)) =
j−1∑
k=1
SkSk+1 +SjD, 1≤ j ≤ n, and di(S(j)) =
j−1∑
k=i
SkSk+1 +SjD, 1≤ i≤ j ≤ n.
(11)
The cost functions then become
OC(S(j)) = αopd(S(j)) = αop
(
j−1∑
k=1
SkSk+1 +SjD
)
, 1≤ j ≤ n.
ICi(S(j)) = αi(di(S(j))− di({i})) = αi
(
j−1∑
k=i
SkSk+1 +SjD−SiD
)
, 1≤ i≤ j ≤ n.
The disutilities are given by
DU i(S(j)) = f(i,S(j)) +αi
(
j−1∑
k=i
SkSk+1 +SjD−SiD
)
, 1≤ i≤ j ≤ n.
The IR constraints for any budget-balanced cost sharing scheme simplify to
f(i,N ) +αi
(
n−1∑
k=i
SkSk+1 +SnD−SiD
)
≤ f(i,{i}) = αopSiD, 1≤ i≤ n. (12)
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The SIR constraints (18) and (19) for a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme simplify to(
f(i,S(j))− f(i,S(j− 1))
)
+αi (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)≤ 0, 1≤ i < j ≤ n.
f(j,S(j))≤ αopSjD, 2≤ j ≤ n.
Finally, the SIR-feasibility constraints (10) from Theorem 1 simplify to
Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D≤ SjD
1 + 1
αop
∑j−1
k=1αk
, 2≤ j ≤ n. (13)
Notice that when restricted to the single dropoff scenario, the SIR-feasibility constraints assume a
much simpler form. For each j, the constraint has terms involving only j and j− 1. This “Marko-
vian” nature could prove useful when studying algorithmic problems relating to SIR (see Section 6).
Upon closer inspection, we note that the left hand side of the SIR-feasibility constraints (13) are
nothing but the incremental detours due to picking up subsequent passengers j. Thus, (13) can be
viewed as imposing an upper bound on the permissible incremental detour involved in picking up
passenger j. This bound diminishes with increasing j and increasing proximity to the destination,
which means that as more passengers are picked up, the permissible additional detour to pick up yet
another passenger keeps shrinking, which is natural. For the passengers in Example 1, Fig. 2 shows
the evolution of the “SIR-feasible region” (points from which the next passenger can be picked up
so that the resultant route is SIR-feasible) in Euclidean space, when αj = αop for j = 1,2,3. The
shape resembles that of a rotated teardrop.
Figure 2 Evolution of the SIR-feasible region (dark shade) while picking up passengers that are traveling to a
common destination. Note that the region diminishes rapidly with every subsequent pickup.
4.1. Bounds on Total Distance Traveled along SIR-Feasible Routes
The bounds on incremental detours given by the SIR-feasibility constraints (13) can be combined
to obtain bounds on the total distance traveled by a passenger i∈N along any SIR-feasible route,
as a fraction of their direct travel distance SiD. We call this measure the “starvation factor” of
passenger i. The starvation factor of a route is the maximum starvation factor among all the
passengers. Intuitively, the starvation factor of a route is a decreasing function of the ratios αk
αop
,
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since the permissible detours are, from (13). That is, passengers that are more sensitive to detours
should suffer smaller starvation factors. Our goal in this section is to quantify this intuition.
Let I(n) denote the space of all single dropoff instances of size n (consisting of n pickup points
and a common dropoff point from an underlying metric space). Given an instance p ∈ I(n), let
R(p) denote the set of all SIR-feasible routes for this instance.
Given an SIR-feasible route r ∈R(p), let γr(i) = di(N ;r)SiD denote the starvation factor of passenger
i along route r, where di(N ; r) =
∑n−1
k=i SkSk+1 +SnD, from (11), and let γr = maxi∈N γr(i) denote
the starvation factor of the route r.
Definition 8. The SIR-starvation factor over all single dropoff instances of size n is
γ(n) = max
p∈I(n)
min
r∈R(p)
γr.
We show the following bounds for γ(n):
1. Upper Bounds: (Theorems 2-4) The worst starvation factor among SIR-feasible routes,
maxp∈I(n) maxr∈R(p) γr, is (i) Θ(2n) when
αi
αop
→ 0, (ii) Θ(√n) when αi
αop
= 1, and (iii) 1 when
αi
αop
→∞, for all i ∈ N . As upper bounds for γ(n), these are not necessarily tight, since an
instance for which an SIR-feasible route has the worst starvation factor may also admit other
SIR-feasible routes with smaller starvation factors.
2. Lower Bounds: (Theorem 5) γ(n) is no smaller than (i) Θ(n) when αi
αop
→ 0, and (ii) Θ(logn)
when αi
αop
= 1, for all i∈N . These lower bounds are tight.
It is interesting to note that the gap between the upper and lower bounds narrows down and
vanishes as αi
αop
increases to ∞.6 The proofs are complex, and can be found in Appendix A.
We begin by establishing an almost obvious result that when passengers are infinitely incon-
venienced by even the smallest of detours,7 the only SIR-feasible routes (indeed, even IR-feasible
routes) are those with zero detours, which implies a starvation factor of 1.
Theorem 2. If αi
αop
→∞ for all i∈N , then γr = 1 for any SIR-feasible route r.
Next, we consider passengers who value their time more than αop, and show that the worst they
would have to endure is a sublinear starvation factor, in particular, Θ(
√
n). This is tight, that
is, there exists an SIR-feasible route with Θ(
√
n) starvation factor, when αi = αop for all i ∈ N .
However, as the αi keep increasing beyond αop, this bound becomes looser, culminating in a Θ(
√
n)
gap when αi→∞, as evidenced by Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. If αi
αop
≥ 1 for all i∈N , then γr ≤ 2
√
n for any SIR-feasible route r.
6 Note that, by definition, 1 is always a trivial lower bound for the starvation factor of any route, since the points are
from an underlying metric space.
7 Frankly, why would such passengers even consider ridesharing?
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Even though it may be unrealistic, as an academic exercise, we investigate an upper bound on
γr when the passengers are completely unaffected by detours, that is,
αi
αop
→ 0 for all i ∈ N . Not
surprisingly, it turns out that the starvation factor can be exponentially large in such a scenario,
as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 4. If αi
αop
→ 0 for all i∈N , then γr ≤ 2n for any SIR-feasible route r.
The upper bounds of Theorems 3-4 on γr are tight, as discussed next; however, by Definition 8,
they also serve as upper bounds on γ(n), in which capacity, they may not necessarily be tight. This is
because, an instance for which an SIR-feasible route has the worst starvation factor may also admit
better SIR-feasible routes. For example, Fig. 3 depicts an instance in one-dimensional Euclidean
space for which the route (S1, S2, . . . , Sn,D) is SIR-feasible (satisfying (21) with equality) and has a
starvation factor of Θ(
√
n). (The same instance with the distances appropriately modified illustrates
the Θ(2n) starvation factor of Theorem 4.) However, note that the reverse route (Sn, Sn−1, . . . , S1,D)
is also SIR-feasible and has a starvation factor of 1.
Figure 3 Single dropoff instance with a route (S1, S2, . . . , Sn,D) whose starvation factor is Θ(
√
n). If the
distances SiD, 1≤ i≤ n, were 2i−1` instead, then the starvation factor of the same route would be Θ(2n).
Finally, we establish a tight lower bound on γ(n) for arbitrary αi > 0, by exhibiting an instance
with a unique SIR-feasible route with the desired starvation factor.
Theorem 5. γ(n)≥∑nj=1 (1 + 1αop∑j−1k=1αk)−1.
It is easy to observe that the lower bound of Theorem 5 simplifies to Θ(logn) when αi
αop
= 1, and
Θ(n) when αi
αop
→ 0, for all i∈N .
5. The Benefit of Ridesharing and Sequential Fairness
In this section, we explore the consequences of sequential fairness (defined in Section 2.3) on the
design of cost sharing schemes for ridesharing, in the single dropoff scenario. First, for 2≤ j ≤ n,
1≤ i≤ j, the expression for incremental benefit to passenger i due to the addition of passenger j
is
IBi(S(j)) =
{
f(i,S(j− 1))− f(i,S(j))−αi (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D) , 1≤ i < j
αopSjD− f(j,S(j)), i= j.
(14)
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Thus, for 2≤ j ≤ n, the total incremental benefit due to the addition of passenger j is given by
T IB(S(j)) =
j∑
k=1
IBk(S(j)) = αopSjD−
(
αop +
j−1∑
k=1
αk
)
(Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D) , (15)
where the dependence on f vanishes due to budget-balance.
For the single dropoff scenario, the incremental inconvenience cost to i due to the detour caused
by j is given by ICi(Sij)−ICi(Si(j−1)) = αi (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D); hence, Definition 6 simplifies
to the following equivalent definition.
Definition 9. Given a vector ~β = (β2, β3, . . . , βn), where 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, a budget
balanced cost sharing scheme f is ~β-sequentially fair if, on any SIR-feasible route,
(∀ 2≤ j ≤ n) IBi(S(j))T IB(S(j)) =
{
βj
αi∑j−1
m=1 αm
, 1≤ i≤ j− 1
1−βj, i= j.
Note that 1−βj denotes the fraction of the total incremental benefit enjoyed by the new passenger
j as a result of having them join the ride, and βj denotes the remaining fraction, which is split
among the existing passengers in proportion to their αi values.
It turns out that the requirements imposed by Definition 9, while perhaps appearing to be quite
lenient, are sufficient for a strong and meaningful characterization of sequentially fair cost sharing
schemes, as we discuss next.
5.1. Characterizing Sequentially Fair Cost Sharing Schemes
We begin this section with a theorem that provides an exact characterization of budget balanced
sequentially fair cost sharing schemes for single dropoff scenarios.
Theorem 6. Given a vector ~β = (β2, β3, . . . , βn), where 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, a budget-
balanced cost sharing scheme f is ~β-sequentially fair if and only if, for 2≤ j ≤ n,
• The cost to the incoming passenger j is given by
f(j,S(j)) = βj
[
αopSjD
]
+ (1−βj)
[(
αop +
j−1∑
m=1
αm
)
(Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
]
. (16)
• The incremental “discount” to each existing passenger 1≤ i≤ j− 1 is given by
f(i, S(j− 1))− f(i, S(j)) = βj
[
αi∑j−1
m=1αm
(αopSjD−αop(Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D))
]
+ (1−βj)
[
αi (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
]
.
(17)
We omit the proof, since it is simply a straightforward substitution of equations (14)-(15) in
Definition 9 and rearrangement of the terms. The characterization of Theorem 6 reveals elegant
structural properties of sequentially fair cost sharing schemes:
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(a) Online Implementability. When a passenger j is picked up, their estimated cost is given
by f(j,S(j)), which is their final payment if there are no more pickups. At the same time,
each existing passenger i is offered a “discount” in the amount of f(i,S(j − 1))− f(i,S(j))
that brings down their earlier cost estimates. This suggests a novel “reverse-meter” design for
a ridesharing application on each passenger’s smartphone that keeps track of their estimated
final payment, as the ride progresses. Starting with f(i,S(i)) when passenger i begins their
ride, it would keep decreasing every time a detour begins to pick up a new passenger. Such a
visually compelling interface would encourage wider adoption of ridesharing.
(b) Convex Combination of Extreme Schemes. For each j, 2≤ j ≤ n, the cost sharing scheme
is a convex combination of the following two extreme schemes:
• The total incremental benefit is fully enjoyed by the incoming passenger j, i.e., βj =
0. Here, from (16)-(17), the incoming passenger j (a) pays the service provider an amount
αop(Sj−1Sj + SjD − Sj−1D) that corresponds to the increase in the operational cost, and
(b) pays each existing passenger 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1 an amount αi(Sj−1Sj + SjD − Sj−1D) that
corresponds to the incremental inconvenience cost they suffered.
• The total incremental benefit is fully enjoyed by the existing passengers 1≤ i≤ j− 1, i.e.,
βj = 1. Here, from (16)-(17), the incoming passenger j pays αopSjD, the same as they would
have paid for a private ride. From this, the service provider recovers αop(Sj−1Sj+SjD−Sj−1D)
that corresponds to the increase in the operational cost, and what is left is split among the
existing passengers proportional to their αi values.
Note that the incoming passenger j pays the least in the former scheme (βj = 0) and the most
in the latter scheme (βj = 1).
(c) Transfers Between Passengers. From the previous observation, it follows that incoming
passengers must, at minimum, fully compensate existing passengers for the incremental incon-
venience costs that resulted from the detour to pick them up, which can be viewed as internal
transfers between passengers. Even though it may be reasonable to expect this from a fair cost
sharing scheme, it is remarkable that sequential fairness mandates this property.
In designing a sequentially fair cost sharing scheme, ~β can be chosen strategically to incentivize
commuters to rideshare. A commonly used incentive is to guarantee a minimum discount on the
cost of a private ride. In our framework of sequentially fair cost sharing schemes, it corresponds to
setting βj so that f(j,S(j)) is a desired fraction of αopSjD.
8 We end this section with an example.
8 The SIR-feasibility constraints would have to be appropriately tightened to guarantee such a discount.
Gopalakrishnan, Mukherjee, and Tulabandhula: The Costs and Benefits of Sharing
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-17-01173 17
Example 2. Consider the single dropoff scenario, where we also assume that αi = αop = 1 for
all i∈N . For 1≤ i≤ j ≤ n, we define the cost sharing scheme f XC as:
f XC(i, S(j)) =
(
j∑
k=i+1
Sk−1Sk
k− 1 +
SjD
j
)
+(i−1) (Si−1Si +SiD−Si−1D)−
(
j∑
k=i+1
(Sk−1Sk +SkD−Sk−1D)
)
,
The first terms correspond to dividing the operational cost of each segment equally among the
ridesharing passengers traveling along that segment. The second terms correspond to the passenger
i compensating each of the i−1 passengers that were picked up earlier, for the incremental detour
they suffered. The last terms correspond to the net compensation received by passenger i from all
passengers that were picked up later, for the incremental detours that i suffered.
Intuitively, f XC is a “fair” cost sharing scheme. In fact, it can be shown that for ~β =
(
1
2
, 1
3
, . . . , 1
n
)
,
it is a ~β-sequentially fair cost sharing scheme:
From (16)-(17), we get
IBj(S(j))
T IB(S(j)) =
SjD− f XC(j,S(j))
SjD− j (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
=
SjD−
(
SjD
j
+ (j− 1) (Sj−1Si +SjD−Sj−1D)
)
SjD− j (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D) =
j− 1
j
= 1− 1
j
,
as desired. Also, for 1≤ i≤ j− 1, we get
IBi(S(j))
T IB(S(j)) =
f XC(i, S(j− 1))− f XC(i, S(j))− (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
SjD− j (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
=
Sj−1D
j−1 −
(
Sj−1Sj
j−1 +
SjD
j
)
+ (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)− (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
SjD− j (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
=
SjD
j(j−1) − 1j−1 (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D)
SjD− j (Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D) =
1
j
1
j− 1 .
6. New Algorithmic Problems
As discussed in Section 3.1, the SIR-feasibility constraints (10) or (13), can be considered as
additional constraints to the routing optimization problem. For instance, vehicle routing problems
with various operational objectives, ridesharing with multiple pickups and dropoff points, online
routing problems can all benefit from incorporating SIR-feasibility constraints while performing
route optimization. As a concrete example, consider the following single dropoff ride matching and
routing problem:
Given n pickup points and a common dropoff point in a metric space, (a) does there exist an
allocation of pickup points to 1≤m≤ n vehicles, each with capacity d n
m
e ≤ c≤ n, such that there
exists an SIR-feasible route for each vehicle? And (b) if so, what is the allocation and corresponding
routes that minimize the total “vehicle-miles” traveled?
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We do not know whether the feasibility problem (a) can be solved in polynomial time, even when
m= 1 and αi = αj for all 1≤ i, j ≤ n, where it reduces to finding a sequence of the pickup points
that satisfies the inequalities (13). The “Markovian” nature of these inequalities (each inequality
only depends on adjacent pickup points in the route) suggests that it may be worth trying to
come up with a polynomial time algorithm for the feasibility problem. In Section 6.1, we show that
this problem is NP-hard when not restricted to a metric space, which implies that any poly-time
algorithm, if one exists, must necessarily exploit the properties of a metric space. However, even if
one succeeds in this endeavor, we show in Section 6.2 that the optimization (b) over all SIR-feasible
routes is NP-hard.
Like SIR-feasibility, there might be other constraints on the ordering of the pickup points (for
instance, due to hard requirements on pickup times). Studying such variants might help understand
how to tackle SIR-feasibility constraints. For example, it is known that finding the optimal alloca-
tion (minimizing the total vehicle-miles traveled) of passengers to vehicles without any restriction
on the order of pickups is NP-hard Cordeau et al. (2006). On the other hand, as we show in
Section 6.3, the problem is polynomial time solvable if a strict total ordering is imposed and the
capacity of each vehicle is unrestricted. It then becomes an interesting future direction to investigate
what kinds of order constraints retain polynomial time solvability of the problem.
6.1. Determining Existence of SIR-Feasible Routes is Hard
In this section, we present Theorem 7, which shows that, for the single-dropoff scenario, determining
whether an SIR-feasible route exists is NP-hard in general, by a reduction from the undirected
Hamiltonian path problem.9 The proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Definition 10. Given a set N of n pickup points, and a common dropoff point in an underlying
(possibly non-metric) space, and positive coefficients αop, α1, α2, . . . , αn, SIR-Feasibility is the
problem of determining whether an SIR-feasible route of length n exists, that is, whether there
exists a sequence of the pickup points that satisfies the SIR-feasibility constraints (13).
Theorem 7. SIR-Feasibility is NP-hard.
However, it can be easily seen that SIR-Feasibility is not hard in certain special cases and
in certain metric spaces. Consider an input graph, where the pickup points and the dropoff point
are embedded on a line, and αi = αop for all i∈N . Without loss of generality, we assume that the
pickup points {S1, . . . , Sn} appear in the same order on the line, so that S1 and Sn are the two
end points. Clearly, if the destination D occurs before S1 (respectively, after Sn), the instance is
9 Given an undirected graph, a Hamiltonian path is a path in the graph that visits each vertex exactly once. The
undirected Hamiltonian path problem is to determine, given an undirected graph, whether a Hamiltonian path exists.
It is known to be NP-hard.
Gopalakrishnan, Mukherjee, and Tulabandhula: The Costs and Benefits of Sharing
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-17-01173 19
SIR-feasible. This is because the route starting from Sn (respectively, S1) and ending at D, visiting
all the pickup points along the way incurs zero detour for everyone, and is thus SIR-feasible. In fact,
such a route also traverses the minimum distance among all feasible routes. However, consider the
case where D is located at some intermediate location. Such an instance will never be SIR-feasible.
To see this, first consider an instance where n= 2, and S1 <D<S2. Let S1D= x, S2D= y; hence
S1S2 = x+ y. We analyze the SIR-feasiblity constraints (13) for each of two cases. If S1 is visited
before S2, then SIR-feasibility requires that x+ y+ y−x≤ y2 , which is impossible. Similarly, if S2
is visited before S1, then SIR-feasibility requires that x+ y+ x− y ≤ x2 , which is also impossible.
Now, when n > 2 and D is located at an intermediate point, any feasible route must, at some
point, “jump over” D from some Si to another Sj, at which stage the analysis would be the same
as that for n= 2, and is therefore not SIR-feasible. A similar phenomenon can be observed when
the underlying metric is a tree rooted at D and the pickup points are located at the leaves, and
αi = αop for all i ∈ N . It can be shown that instances where the pickup points are spread across
more than one subtree rooted at D cannot be SIR-feasible, and when the pickup points are all part
of a single subtree rooted at D, SIR-feasibility can be checked in polynomial time. We leave open
the problem of determining whether SIR-Feasibility is hard in general metric spaces.
6.2. Optimizing over SIR-Feasible Routes is Hard
Given an undirected weighted graph, the problem of determining an optimal Hamiltonian cycle10
(one that minimizes the sum of the weights of its edges) is a well known problem called the Traveling
Salesperson Problem, abbreviated as TSP. A slight variant of this problem, known as Path-TSP, is
when the traveling salesperson is not necessarily required to return to the starting point or depot, in
which case we only seek an optimal Hamiltonian path. These problems are NP-hard (Papadimitriou
1994). Special cases of the above problems arise when the graph is complete and the edge weights
correspond to distances between vertices from a metric space. These variants, which we call Metric-
TSP and Metric-Path-TSP, respectively, are also NP-hard, e.g., Papadimitriou (1977) showed the
hardness for the Euclidean metric.
Definition 11. Given a set N of n pickup points, a common dropoff point in an underlying
metric space, and positive coefficients αop, α1, α2, . . . , αn, Opt-SIR-Route is the problem of finding
an SIR-feasible route of length n of minimum total distance.
Theorem 8. Opt-SIR-Route is NP-hard.
The proof is via a reduction from Metric-Path-TSP ; see Appendix B.
10 A Hamiltonian cycle is a Hamiltonian path that is a cycle. In other words, it is a cycle in the graph that visits each
vertex exactly once.
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6.3. Optimal Allocation of Totally Ordered Passengers to Uncapacitated Vehicles
In this section, we present a polynomial time algorithm for optimal allocation of passengers to
vehicles (minimizing the total vehicle-miles traveled), given a total order on the pickups, and when
the capacity of any vehicle is unrestricted. To the best of our knowledge, this result is new; see Prins
et al. (2014) for a survey on related problem variants.
Our result relies on reducing the allocation problem to a minimum cost flow problem on a flow
network with integral capacities. We are given the set N of passengers (that is, the set of n ordered
pickup locations) traveling to a single dropoff location D. Without loss of generality, we let the
indices in N reflect the position in the pickup order, that is, u∈N is the u-th pick up from location
Su. For convenience, we index the destination D as n+1. Let the unknown optimal assignment use
1≤m′ ≤ n vehicles (we address how to find it later). A directed acyclic flow network (see Figure 4)
is then constructed as follows:
(1) s and t denote the source and sink vertices, respectively.
(2) For each passenger/pickup location u∈N , we create two vertices and an edge: an entry vertex
uin, an exit vertex uout, and an edge of cost 0 and capacity 1 directed from uin to uout. We also
create a vertex n+ 1 corresponding to the dropoff location.
(3) We create n edges, one each of cost 0 and capacity 1 from the source vertex s to each of the
entry vertices uin, u∈N .
(4) We create n edges, one each of cost SuD and capacity 1 from each of the exit vertices uout,
u∈N , to the dropoff vertex n+ 1.
(5) To encode the pickup order, for each 1 ≤ u < v ≤ n we create an edge of cost (SuSv − L)
and capacity 1 directed from uout to vin, where L is a sufficiently large number satisfying
L> 2maxu,v∈N∪{n+1}SuSv.
(6) We add a final edge of cost 0 and capacity m′ from the dropoff vertex n+ 1 to the sink vertex
t, thereby limiting the maximum flow in the network to m′ units.
Since all the edge capacities are integral, the integrality theorem guarantees an integral minimum
cost maximum flow, and we assume access to a poly-time algorithm to compute it in a network
with possibly negative costs on edges. Notice that we do have negative edge costs (step (5) of the
above construction); however, our network is a directed acyclic graph, owing to the fact that there
is a total ordering on the pickup locations. Hence, there are no negative cost cycles.
We defer the full proof to Appendix B.3; however, we briefly outline the steps involved:
• Any integral maximum flow from s to t must be comprised of m′ vertex-disjoint paths between
the source vertex s and the dropoff vertex n+ 1.
• Any integral minimum cost flow must cover all the 2n pickup vertices, that is, a unit of flow
enters every entry vertex uin, and a unit of flow exits each exit vertex uout, u∈N .
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Figure 4 Illustration of the directed acyclic flow network, a minimum cost maximum flow on which corresponds
to an assignment of n totally ordered passengers to m′ uncapacitated vehicles. Each of the edge labels
correspond to a tuple consisting of edge cost and edge capacity.
• The partition of N according to the m′ vertex-disjoint paths between s and n + 1 in an
integral minimum cost maximum flow corresponds to the optimal allocation of the n totally ordered
passengers among m′ uncapacitated vehicles.
Finally, we argue that the overall optimal assignment can be obtained by computing the optimal
assignments using the above reduction for each 1≤m′ ≤ n and choosing the one with the overall
minimum cost, which completes the reduction.
7. Concluding Remarks
In addition to the discussion in Section 2.4, and the open algorithmic questions raised in the
previous section, there are a few other important aspects that we believe future work should
address. We conclude the paper with brief discussions of these issues.
Throughout, we have assumed knowledge of the passengers’ αi values; but in reality, they are
most likely private information, especially in commercial ridesharing. One can either attempt to
learn these values over time from passenger feedback, or, one can ask the passenger for this infor-
mation. In the latter case, truthful reporting is a concern. Since our framework explicitly takes into
account the inconvenience costs of passengers while considering SIR-feasibility as well as sequential
fairness, no sequentially fair cost sharing scheme can be dominant strategy incentive compatible. It
would be interesting to study the trade-offs between efficiency, fairness, budget-balance, and incen-
tive compatibility. The best framework in which to study these questions (including in more general
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settings where there is uncertainty about future pickup requests) is perhaps online mechanism
design (Parkes 2007, Zhao et al. 2015, Shen et al. 2016).
The duality between cost sharing and benefit sharing in our framework is worth a deeper analysis.
While the space of cost sharing schemes that the two views accommodate are no different from each
other, there is a crucial difference in approaching their design. In particular, notice that a budget
balanced cost sharing scheme need only recover the operational costs; see (1). The inconvenience
costs experienced by the passengers are a separate artifact of our framework, which only explicitly
affect the design of cost sharing schemes when viewed through the lens of benefit sharing and
sequential fairness. What “traditional” fairness properties does a sequentially fair cost sharing
scheme possess? Under what conditions, if any, is it a (generalized) Shapley value, or is in the core?
Appendix A: Proofs from Section 4
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof follows from expanding the SIR constraints (4). First, for any 2≤ j ≤ n, and 1≤ i≤ j−1, the SIR
constraint can be expanded as
f(i, S(j)) + ICi(S(j))≤ f(i, S(j− 1)) + ICi(S(j− 1))
=⇒
(
f(i, S(j))− f(i, S(j− 1))
)
+
(
ICi(S(j))−ICi(S(j− 1))
)
≤ 0. (18)
For i= j, the SIR constraint can be expanded as
f(j,S(j)) + ICj(S(j))≤ f(j,{j})
=⇒ f(j,S(j))≤ αopd({j})−ICj(S(j)),
(19)
where, it follows from budget-balance that f(j,{j}) = αopd({j}).
The “only if” direction can be seen to hold by adding all the j inequalities given by (18) and (19), for all
2≤ j ≤ n.( j∑
i=1
f(i, S(j))−
j−1∑
i=1
f(i, S(j− 1))
)
+
j−1∑
i=1
(
ICi(S(j))−ICi(S(j− 1))
)
≤ αopd({j})−ICj(S(j)).
Using the budget-balance property (1) to simplify the first two terms, we get(
OC(S(j))−OC(S(j− 1))
)
+
j−1∑
i=1
(
ICi(S(j))−ICi(S(j− 1))
)
≤ αopd({j})−ICj(S(j)). (20)
Equation (10) then follows by substituting for OC(·) and ICi(·) from (8) and (9) respectively, and simplifying.
Next, we prove the “if” direction. Assuming that (10) holds, or, alternatively, assuming that (20)
holds, it suffices to exhibit a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme f , under which all the SIR constraints
given by (18) and (19) are satisfied. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and 1 ≤ i ≤ j, we construct f(i, S(j)) recursively, so
that (18) and (19) are satisfied. The base case follows from budget-balance, that is, f(i,{i}) = αopd({i}) for
all i∈N . Assume that for some 2≤ j ≤ n, we have defined f(i, S(j− 1)) for all 1≤ i≤ j− 1. Then, we set
f(i, S(j)) = f(i, S(j− 1))−
(
ICi(S(j))−ICi(S(j− 1))
)
, 1≤ i≤ j− 1
f(j,S(j)) =OC(S(j))−
j−1∑
i=1
f(i, S(j)).
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By construction, it follows that (18) is satisfied, and f is budget-balanced. It remains to be shown that (19)
is also satisfied. By budget balance,
f(j,S(j)) =OC(S(j))−
j−1∑
i=1
f(i, S(j))
=OC(S(j))−
j−1∑
i=1
(
f(i, S(j− 1))−
(
ICi(S(j))−ICi(S(j− 1))
))
=
(
OC(S(j))−OC(S(j− 1))
)
+
j−1∑
i=1
(
ICi(S(j))−ICi(S(j− 1))
)
≤ αopd({j})−ICj(S(j)),
where, the last step follows from the assumption that (20) holds, and the previous step follows from the
budget-balance property. This completes the proof. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
First, we note that in the limit, when αi
αop
→∞ for all i∈N , the SIR-feasibility constraints (13) reduce to
Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D≤ 0, 2≤ j ≤ n.
Since the points are from an underlying metric space, distances satisfy the triangle inequality, which means
Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D≥ 0, 2≤ j ≤ n.
Therefore, it must be that
Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D= 0, 2≤ j ≤ n.
By summing up the last n− i equations, i.e., i+ 1≤ j ≤ n, we get
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD−SiD= 0,
from which we obtain
γr = max
i∈N
(∑n−1
j=i SjSj+1 +SnD
SiD
)
= 1.
This completes the proof. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
First, we note that under the constraint αi
αop
≥ 1 for all i∈N , the SIR-feasibility constraints (13) imply
Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D≤ SjD
j
, 2≤ j ≤ n. (21)
We begin by deriving an upper bound on the starvation factor of the i-th passenger, 1≤ i < n, along any
SIR-feasible route. (Note that, in any single dropoff instance, the starvation factor of the last passenger to
be picked up is always 1.) First, we sum up the last n− i inequalities of (21), i.e., i+ 1≤ j ≤ n, to obtain
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD−SiD≤
n∑
j=i
SjD
j
. (22)
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Next, we derive upper bounds for each SjD, i < j ≤ n, in terms of SiD. The j-th SIR-feasibility constraint
from (21) can be rewritten as
SjD− SjD
j
≤ Sj−1D−Sj−1Sj .
We know that Sj−1Sj + Sj−1D ≥ SjD, since all points are from an underlying metric space and therefore,
distances are symmetric and satisfy the triangle inequality. Using this inequality above, we get
SjD− SjD
j
≤ Sj−1D− (SjD−Sj−1D)
=⇒ (2j− 1)SjD≤ 2jSj−1D
=⇒ SjD≤ 2j
2j− 1Sj−1D.
Unraveling the recursion yields
SjD≤
(
j∏
k=i+1
2k
2k− 1
)
SiD=
Cj
Ci
SiD,
where, for m≥ 1, Cm =
∏m
k=1
2k
2k−1 . We can evaluate Cj as follows:
Cj =
j∏
k=1
2k
2k− 1 =
j∏
k=1
(2k)2
2k(2k− 1) =
22j(j!)2
(2j)!
=
22j(
2j
j
) .
We then use a known lower bound for the central binomial coefficient,
(
2j
j
)≥ 22j−1√
j
, to obtain Cj ≤ 2
√
j. This
yields SjD≤ 2
√
j
Ci
SiD. Substituting in (22), we get
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD−SiD≤
n∑
j=i
2
Ci
√
j
j
SiD=
2
Ci
(
n∑
j=i
1√
j
)
SiD
=⇒
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD≤
(
1 +
2
Ci
(
n∑
j=i
1√
j
))
SiD.
This results in the desired upper bound for the starvation factor of the i-th passenger along any SIR-feasible
route:
γr(i)≤ 1 + 2
Ci
(
n∑
j=i
1√
j
)
.
The starvation factor of a route is the maximum starvation factor of all its passengers:
γr = max
i∈N
γr(i)≤ max
1≤i<n
(
1 +
2
Ci
(
n∑
j=i
1√
j
))
= 1 +
2
C1
(
n∑
j=1
1√
j
)
= 1 +
n∑
j=1
1√
j
,
since Ci is increasing in i and C1 = 2. The final step is to show that for all n≥ 1,
∑n
j=1
1√
j
≤ 2√n− 1. The
proof is by induction. The base case (for n= 1) is satisfied with equality. Assume that the statement is true
for some k≥ 1. Then, for k+ 1, we have, ∑k+1j=1 1√j ≤ 2√k−1 + 1√k+1 = √4k(k+1)+1√k+1 −1≤ √4k(k+1)+1+1√k+1 −1 =
(2k+1)+1√
k+1
− 1 = 2√k+ 1 − 1, which completes the inductive step. Using this bound, we get γr ≤ 2
√
n, as
desired. This completes the proof. 
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A.4. Proof of Theorem 4
First, we note that in the limit, when αi
αop
→ 0 for all i∈N , the SIR-feasibility constraints (13) reduce to
Sj−1Sj +SjD−Sj−1D≤ SjD, 2≤ j ≤ n. (23)
Our proof technique is exactly the same as that for Theorem 3. We begin by deriving an upper bound on
the starvation factor of the i-th passenger, 1≤ i < n, along any SIR-feasible route, by summing up the last
n− i inequalities of (23) to obtain
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD−SiD≤
n∑
j=i
SjD. (24)
Next, we derive upper bounds for each SjD, i < j ≤ n, in terms of SiD. The j-th SIR-feasibility constraint
from (23) can be rewritten as Sj−1Sj ≤ Sj−1D. Using this in the triangle inequality SjD≤ Sj−1Sj +Sj−1D,
we get SjD≤ 2Sj−1D. Unraveling this recursion then yields SjD≤ 2j−iSiD. Substituting this in (24),
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD−SiD≤
n∑
j=i
2n−iSiD=
n−i∑
j=0
2jSiD=
(
2n−i+1− 1)SiD
=⇒
n−1∑
j=i
SjSj+1 +SnD≤ 2n−i+1SiD.
Thus, the starvation factor of the i-th passenger along any SIR-feasible route is upper bounded as γr(i)≤
2n−i+1. Finally,
γr = max
i∈N
γr(i)≤ max
1≤i<n
2n−i+1 = 2n.
This completes the proof. 
A.5. Proof of Theorem 5
To reduce notational clutter, we let zj =
(
1 + 1
αop
∑j−1
k=1αk
)−1
, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We exhibit a single dropoff
instance of size n for which there is a unique SIR-feasible path whose starvation factor is exactly
∑n
j=1 zj .
This instance is depicted in Fig. 5. Here, SjD= ` for 1≤ j ≤ n, and Sj−1Sk >Sj−1Sj = zj` for 2≤ j < k≤ n.
It is straightforward to see that the route (S1, S2, . . . , Sn,D) is SIR-feasible from (13), since for 2≤ j ≤ n,
we have Sj−1Sj + SjD− Sj−1D = zj`+ `− `= zjSjD, by construction. Thus, the starvation factor for this
route is given by
∑n
j=2 zj + 1 =
∑n
j=1 zj , as desired.
It remains to be shown that no other route is SIR-feasible. First, we note that the SIR-feasibility con-
straints (13) for this example simplify to
Sj−1Sj ≤ zj`, 2≤ j ≤ n, (25)
where z2 > z3 > . . . > zn, and Sj refers to the j-th pickup point along the route. The proof is by induction.
First, consider the pickup point S1, whose distance from S2 is z2`, and from any other pickup point is strictly
greater than z2`, by construction. From (25), it can be seen that no two pickup points that are more than
z2` apart can be visited in succession, and that the only way to visit two pickup points that are exactly z2`
apart is to visit them first and second. Thus, any SIR-feasible route must begin by visiting S1 and S2 first.
This logic can be extended to build the unique SIR-feasible route that we analyzed above. This completes
the proof. 
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Figure 5 Single dropoff instance to establish lower bound on the SIR-starvation factor.
Appendix B: Proofs from Section 6
B.1. Proof of Theorem 7
Given an instance of the Hamiltonian path problem in the form of a simple, undirected graph G= (V,E),
where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, we construct an instance of SIR-Feasibility as follows. Let Pj denote a pickup
point corresponding to vertex vj ∈ V . Let N = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} denote the set of pickup points, and D denote
the common dropoff point. Then, we set the pairwise distances to
PiPj =
{
`
n
, (vi, vj)∈E
`, otherwise,
where ` > 0 is any constant. We also set PiD = ` for all i, and αop = α1 = α2 = . . . = αn, so that the
SIR-feasibility constraints are given by (21). Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of
Hamiltonian paths in G and the set of SIR-feasible routes in the corresponding instance of SIR-Feasibility,
as follows:
1. Given a Hamiltonian path through a sequence of vertices (u1, u2, . . . , un) in G, let the corresponding
sequence of pickup points be (S1, S2, . . . , Sn). Then, the route (S1, S2, . . . , Sn,D) is SIR-feasible, since
the SIR-feasibility constraints (21) reduce to Sj−1Sj ≤ `j for 2≤ j ≤ n, which are true, by construction.
2. Given an SIR-feasible route (S1, S2, . . . , Sn,D), let the corresponding sequence of vertices in G be
(u1, u2, . . . , un). Since the route is SIR-feasible, it must be that Sj−1Sj ≤ `j for 2≤ j ≤ n. By construction,
this means that Sj−1Sj =
`
n
, implying that (uj−1, uj) ∈E for 2≤ j ≤ n. Thus, the corresponding path
is Hamiltonian.
Hence, any algorithm for SIR-Feasibility can be used to solve the undirected Hamiltonian path problem
with a polynomial overhead in running time. Since the latter is NP-hard, so is the former. This completes
the proof. 
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B.2. Proof of Theorem 8
Given an instance of Metric-Path-TSP in the form of a complete undirected graph G= (V,E) and distances
d(vi, vj) for each vi, vj ∈ V from a metric space, we construct an instance of Opt-SIR-Route as follows. Let
Pj denote a pickup point corresponding to vertex vj ∈ V . Let N = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} denote the set of pickup
points, and D denote the common dropoff point.
We set the pairwise distances PiPj to be equal to d(vi, vj) for all vi, vj ∈ V . We also set PiD=L for all i,
where
L>n
(
max
1≤i<j≤n
PiPj
)
is any constant. We also set αop = α1 = α2 = . . .= αn, so that the SIR-feasibility constraints are given by (21).
It is easy to see that for any route (S1, S2, . . . , Sn,D), these SIR-feasibility constraints reduce to Sj−1Sj ≤ `j
for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, which are true, by construction and our choice of L. Thus, all n! routes in our constructed
instance of Opt-SIR-Route are SIR-feasible. Moreover, by construction, the distance traveled along any route
is exactly L more than the weight of the path determined by the corresponding sequence of vertices in G.
This implies that any optimal SIR-feasible route is given by a sequence of pickup points corresponding to
an optimal Hamiltonian path in G, followed by a visit to D. Hence, any algorithm for Opt-SIR-Route can
be used to solve Metric-Path-TSP with a polynomial overhead in running time. Since the latter is NP-hard,
so is the former. This completes the proof. 
B.3. Proof of Reduction from Section 6.3
Lemma 1. Any integral maximum flow from s to t must be comprised of m′ vertex-disjoint paths between
the source vertex s and the dropoff vertex n+ 1.
Proof. First, we observe that any integral feasible flow from s to t in the network is comprised of vertex-
disjoint paths between the source vertex s and the dropoff vertex n+ 1, each carrying one unit of flow. This
is because, every entry vertex uin has only one outgoing edge, namely, the one directed to its corresponding
exit vertex uout, which has unit capacity. (Similarly, every exit vertex only has one incoming edge, of unit
capacity.) Thus, once a unit of flow is routed through uin and uout by some path, another path cannot route
any additional flow through these vertices. Since the maximum flow on the network is m′ units, any integral
feasible maximum flow would have to have m′ such vertex-disjoint paths between s and n+ 1, each carrying
one unit of flow. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 2. In any integral minimum cost flow, for every u∈N , there is exactly one unit of flow entering
uin and exactly one unit of flow leaving uout.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 1, any integral feasible flow from s to t in the network is comprised of
vertex-disjoint paths between the source vertex s and the dropoff vertex n+ 1. Suppose by way of contra-
diction, an integral minimum cost flow does not route any flow through vin for some v ∈N . Let Gv denote
the set of passengers z ∈N such that z < v and a unit of flow is routed via (zin, zout). Consider two cases:
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1. Case 1: Gv 6= ∅. Let u = maxGv, and let Pu be the path that carries a unit of flow from s to n+ 1
through uin and uout. The first vertex in Pu after uout is either an entry vertex win for some w ∈ N
(with w> v), or the dropoff vertex n+ 1. Then, we construct a new flow where Pu is modified to route
its unit of flow from uout first to vin to vout and then to win or n+ 1, as the case may be. (Note that
this new flow is feasible, since u < v < w < n+ 1.) If M and M ′ denote the costs of the original flow
and the new flow, then, we show that M ′ <M , contradicting the optimality of M :
• If the original flow took the route uout → win, and consequently, the new flow takes the route
uout→ vin→ vout→win, then, M ′ =M +SuSv −L+SvSw−L− (SuSw−L)<M by our choice of L.
• If the original flow took the route uout→ n+ 1, and consequently, the new flow takes the route
uout→ vin→ vout→ n+ 1, then, M ′ =M +SuSv −L+SvSn+1−SuSn+1 <M by our choice of L.
2. Case 2: Gv = ∅. Let w ∈ N be such that a unit of flow is routed from s to win, Pw denoting the
corresponding path. There may be more than one choice for win as defined, but all of them satisfy
v < w, since Gv = ∅, so it does not matter which one is picked. As before, we construct a new flow
where Pw is modified to route its unit of flow from s first to vin to vout and then to win. (Note that
this new flow is feasible, since v < w.) If M and M ′ denote the costs of the original flow and the new
flow, M ′ =M +SvSw−L<M by our choice of L, contradicting the optimality of M .
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3. The partition of N according to the m′ vertex-disjoint paths between s and n+ 1 in an integral
minimum cost maximum flow corresponds to the optimal allocation of the n totally ordered passengers among
m′ uncapacitated vehicles in the single dropoff scenario.
Proof. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know that any integral minimum cost maximum flow F is
comprised of m′ vertex-disjoint paths between s and n+ 1 that cover all n pickup points between them,
by routing a unit of flow along (uin, uout) for all u ∈N . We adopt a simplified representation of a path by
removing the edges from the source vertex s, as well as the edges between uin and uout, the entry and exit
vertices corresponding to pickup points u ∈ N . For example, a path s→ uin→ uout→ vin→ vout→ n+ 1
would be contracted to u→ v→ n+ 1. Note that this does not affect the cost computation, since only zero
cost edges are removed. For any u, v ∈N , the cost of any edge (u, v) in the new representation is simply the
cost of the edge (uout, vin) in the old representation. Similarly, for any u∈N , the cost of any edge (u,n+ 1)
in the new representation is simply the cost of the edge (uout, n+ 1) in the old representation. Let the set of
these m′ paths be denoted as PF . Thus, we have established a one-to-one correspondence between (a) the set
of all integral flows F comprised of m′ vertex-disjoint paths PF that collectively cover all n pickup locations,
and (b) the set of all allocations of n totally ordered passengers (traveling to a single dropoff location n+ 1)
to m′ uncapacitated vehicles.
For any path P ∈PF , let |P | denote the length of the path, that is, the number of edges in the path. The
cost of path P is then given by
c(P ) =
∑∑
1≤u<v≤n
(u,v)∈P
(SuSv −L) +
∑
1≤u≤n
(u,n+1)∈P
SuSn+1.
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Since all paths end with vertex n+ 1, there are |P | − 1 terms in the first sum and 1 term in the last sum.
Thus, c(P ) can be equivalently written as
c(P ) =
∑∑
1≤u<v≤n+1
(u,v)∈P
SuSv − (|P | − 1)L.
The cost of flow F is simply the sum of the costs of the paths in PF , given by
c(F) =
∑
P∈PF
c(P ) =
∑∑
1≤u<v≤n+1
(u,v)∈ ⋃PF
SuSv −
∑
P∈PF
(|P | − 1)L.
Since |P |, the length of path P , also denotes the number of pickup points covered by P , and all the m′ paths
are vertex-disjoint (except for n+ 1), the summation in the second term is simply n−m′, independent of
the flow F . Thus,
c(F) =
∑∑
1≤u<v≤n+1
(u,v)∈ ⋃PF
SuSv − (n−m′)L= c(AF)− (n−m′)L, (26)
where c(AF) denotes the cost (total vehicle-miles traveled) of the corresponding allocation of n totally
ordered passengers (traveling to a single dropoff location n+ 1) to m′ uncapacitated vehicles. From (26), it
is clear that the set of integral minimum cost maximum flows arg minF c(F) also corresponds to the set of
optimal allocations of n totally ordered passengers among m′ uncapacitated vehicles in the single dropoff
scenario. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 9. There exists a poly-time algorithm to find an optimal allocation of totally ordered passengers
to uncapacitated vehicles in the single dropoff scenario.
Proof. Using the one-to-one correspondence established in Lemma 3, for each “guess” 1 ≤m′ ≤ n, we
find the corresponding optimal allocation by solving a minimum cost maximum flow problem in poly-time,
finally choosing a guess with the overall least cost allocation. 
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